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FAIR JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES
IN the recent case of Swain v. Alabama the Supreme Court served
notice that it is not ready to wage a final campaign against exclusion of
Negroes from juries.2 Robert Swain, a Negro, was convicted of rape
in Talladega County, Alabama, and sentenced to death. Unchallenged
evidence showed that no Negro had ever served on a Talladega petit
jury. The Supreme Court upheld Swain's conviction.
Swain alleged that the exclusion of Negroes from petit juries resulted
from the county prosecutor's misuse of the peremptory challenge.0
Alabama uses a variant of the peremptory challenge known as the struck
jury. After the members of the petit jury venire are selected, the de-
fense strikes two and the prosecutor one in alternate turns until only
twelve members are left. In a capital case the venire may consist of more
than 75 people, thus giving both attorneys a large number of strikes.4
In Swain's trial, the prosecutor struck all six Negroes from the venire.5
But both the majority and the dissenters agreed that a finding of dis-
crimination could not be based solely on the prosecutor's action in a
1. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
2. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has reported that
The problem of racial exclusion from jury service is relatively widespread and, in
certain areas, deeply entrenched. The serious and continuing nature of the problem
is revealed by the frequency of cases in which the issue of jury exclusion Is raised
and by local situations which the facts of those cases disclosed; by the plain state-
ments of judges and official observers; and by various field studies conducted by the
Commission's staff.
1961 U.S. COMMIssION ON CIVIL RIGHTs REPORT (Book 5) at 90.
Exclusion persists despite the fact that discrimination in the selection of jurors has
been prohibited by statute, 18 Stat. 336-37 (1875), 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1964), and by a long
series of judicial decisions. A complete list of Supreme Court cases on discriminatory
selection of jurors appears in Swain, supra at 228-29.
3. Id. at 209-10, 222-23. The peremptory challenge is used in every American jurisdic-
tion. It is regarded as an aid to finding an impartial jury because it permits counsel to
remove anyone he suspects is biased without assigning a specific cause for his suspicion.
In most jurisdictions, the number of challenges allowed varies with the offense. Some
jurisdictions allow the prosecution and the defense the same number of challenges, while
many others give more challenges to the defense. See generally A.L.I. CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDuRE, 855-62 (1930). A list of current state statutes on peremptories appears at 380
U.S. at 217 n.20.
4. Id. at 210. See also ALA. CODE tit. 30, §§ 60-64 (1958). The more typical challenge
system works as follows: the prosecution and defense are each allowed a specific num-
ber of challenges. Veniremen are brought in one at a time and after voir dire examina-
tion either counsel may challenge peremptorily. The first twelve veniremen to go un-
challenged constitute the petit jury.
5. 380 U.S. at 210.
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single case.6 The real controversy in Swain concerned the prosecutor's
use of the peremptory challenge to exclude all Negroes from juries
over a long period.
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice White held that the record
in Swain did not "with any acceptable degree of clarity, show when,
how often, and under what circumstances the prosecutor alone has
been responsible for striking ... Negroes ... ." The record did, in
fact, indicate that defense attorneys often struck Negroes. The majority
concluded, therefore, that the record was insufficient to raise the issue
of whether consistent challenging of all Negroes by prosecutors violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 On the other hand, Mr. Justice White
did suggest that
when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or
the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes...
with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Four-
teenth Amendment claim takes on added significance.... In these
circumstances, giving even the widest leeway to the operation of ir-
rational but trial-related suspicions and antagonisms, it would ap-
pear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being
perverted. . . .9
But the high standards of proof required by Mr. Justice White may
vitiate the practical significance of this dictum. Defense attorneys
would find it extremely difficult to "show when, how often, and under
what circumstances the prosecutor alone has been responsible for
striking.. . Negroes," especially since the states are under no obligation
to keep a complete list of challenges of Negro panel members.
The three dissenters, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Gold-
berg, stated that they believed the record in Swain had demonstrated
the prosecutor's discriminatory intent.10 They argued, however, that
even if the record did not expressly show this intent, it was
undisputed that no Negro has ever served on any petit jury in the
history of Talladega County. Under Norris, Patton and the other
6. Id. at 222, 245. This is in accord with numerous decisions in lower federal and
state courts. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 853 (1948); People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12 N.A.2d 466 (1943), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 749 (1944). See also Note, 61 HARv. L. Ray. 1455 (1948).
7. 380 US. at 224.
8. Id. at 224-25.
9. Id. at 223-24.
10. Id. at 233-35. The dissenters relied primarily on the prosecutor's own testimony
that he often approached defense counsel before the formal striking process began and
asked them whether they wished to remove all Negroes.
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cases discussed above, it is clear that petitioner by proving this
made out a prima facie case of unlawful jury exclusion. The
burden of proof then shifted to the State to prove, if it could,
that this exclusion was brought about for some reason other than
racial discrimination in which the State participated.1
In Norris,'2 Patton3 and the other cases14 referred to by Mr. Justice
Goldberg, the Supreme Court had held that a prima facie case of dis-
crimination was established when the record indicated that no Negroes
had served on jury venires over a long period. Mr. Justice Goldberg
felt that the same factors-"availability of evidence, simplicity, and
workability"-which led the Court to shift the burden of proof to
the state in these cases should have led the Court to shift the burden
in Swain.'5 Mr. Justice White disagreed and felt that Justice Goldberg
was "woodenly" and "blind[ly]" applying to petit jury cases the "rule
of exclusion" established in jury venire cases. 16
Given the Supreme Court's record in civil rights, its refusal to
reverse a conviction upon a showing that no Negro has ever served on
a petit jury is anomalous. One possible explanation is that the Court
believed that no rule about peremptory challenges could ensure sub-
stantial representation of Negroes on juries, and that therefore it was
senseless to begin to fashion any rule. Certainly, Mr. Justice Goldberg's
"rule of exclusion" would not work, since it could not be applied when
more than a token number of Negroes had served and could not be
used to judge the prosecutor's actions in a single case. A prosecutor
could evade the rule altogether by allowing a few Negroes to appear
in misdemeanor cases or in some cases involving white defendants. Of
course, a court could meet these tactics by applying the rule of exclusion
to categories of cases involving Negro defendants' 7-misdemeanor,
felony, capital. Each of these categories could in turn be subdivided
according to whether the victim was white or Negro. If in any category
no Negro had ever served on a petit jury a prima facie case of dis-
11. Id. at 238.
12. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
13. Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947).
14. The other cases discussed by Mr. Justice Goldberg include Arnold v. North Caro.
lina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Harper v. State, - Miss. -, 171 So. 2d 129 (1965).
15. 380 U.S. at 240-41.
16. Id. at 227. Admittedly petit jury cases are more complex than venire cases (be.
cause of such factors as the peremptory challenge). But this greater complexity does not
justify upholding a conviction in a county where no Negro has ever served on a petit
jury. Mr. Justice Goldberg was correct to insist that the "rule of exclusion" be applied
in Swain.
17. The court would not apply the rule to cases involving white defendants because
in such cases it can be assumed that the defense is challenging most of the Negroes.
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crimination would be established. But even this category-by-category
approach would not ensure fair representation of Negroes. The num-
ber of cases in a category would frequently be so small that it might
take years before a pattern of discrimination could emerge. And within
each category the prosecutor could allow a few Negroes to appear when
the outcome was certain while challenging them in other cases.
Admittedly, a more rigorous supervision of the prosecutor could be
achieved if his actions in a single case were subject to review. But both
the majority and dissent in Swain agreed that a court could not infer
discrimination from the prosecutor's challenges in any one case.18 Since
the prosecutor might legitimately feel that all the Negroes on a partic-
ular panel were biased, the Court's position seems correct.
The difficulties in supervising the prosecutor's use of the peremptory
challenge may explain the Court's excessive caution in Swain. But if
the Court realized these difficulties, it should have searched for an
alternative method to ensure more adequate Negro participation on
petit juries. One method would be to require that Negroes be more
fairly represented on the venire. In many Southern counties fair
representation on the venire would make it impossible for prosecutors
to strike all Negroes. For example, in Alabama, where the prosecutor
has half as many strikes as the defense counsel, Negroes cannot be
excluded if they represent more than one-third of the venire and if the
defense counsel strikes only whites.'9
In Swain, the Court had an opportunity to begin effective supervision
of venires, but refused to grasp it.20 The record indicated that Negroes
constituted 26% of the age-group eligible for jury service in Talladega
18. See note 6 supra.
19. Since the Alabama system gives the prosecution one-third of the strikes, he is the-
oretically able to remove one-third of the veniremen, white or Negro. Actually, the per-
centage of venirement he can remove decreases as the size of the venire decreases. With
a venire of 75, the prosecutor can strike 21 people [1/3 (75-12)], or 28%. With a venire of
50, he can strike 13 people, or 26%. And with a venire of 24, he can strike only 4 people,
or 17%.
Under the more typical challenge system, see note 4 supra, the percentage of Negroes
that a prosecutor is able to remove from the venire depends on the number of challenges
allowed him and the defense attorney. In Virginia, for example, prosecutors are allowed
only four challenges in felony cases, while in South Carolina they are allowed only five.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-208 (1950); S.C. CoDE § 38-211 (1962). Thus their ability to remove
all Negroes would be ended in many cases if Negroes were fairly represented on venires.
It should be rememberd, moreover, that the prosecutor may not want to use all his
strikes or challenges against Negroes. In many cases he may suspect white veniremen of
being biased and feel compelled to remove them from the venire.
20. Mr. Justice White expressly refused to examine the relationship between Negro
representation on venires and the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge. 380 US.
at 228 n..2.
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County and only 10 to 15% of the veniremen.21 Negroes were thus
under-represented by about 50%.2 Mr. Justice White stated, however,
"MWe cannot say that purposeful discrimination based on race alone
is satisfactorily proved by showing that an identifiable group in a com-
munity is under-represented" to this extent.2 3 White's "purposeful dis-
criminaton" test ladens the Negro defendant with almost impossible
burdens. First, if the defendant shows under-representation, he must
prove further that it was not caused by the fact that Negroes were less
qualified than whites to serve as jurors. Many standards of jury qual-
ification are so vague that the Negro defendant would not be able to
offer the necessary proof. For example, in Alabama, jurors must be
"male citizens in the community over 21 who are reputed to be honest,
intelligent men and [who] are esteemed for their integrity, good char-
acter and sound judgment."24 In Swain, White claimed that the de-
fendant made no "meaningful attempt to demonstrate that the same
proportion of Negroes [as whites] qualified under the standards being
administered by the commissioners." 25 It would seem far more reason-
able to burden the jury commissioners with explaining the administra-
tion of their standards. Second, White would have the defendant prove
that the under-representation was caused by "purposeful discrimina-
tion" rather than by "haphazard" or "imperfect" selection methods.2 0
The defendant could meet this burden only by demonstrating the
commissioners' subjective intent to discriminate.
Despite these criticisms, it must be conceded that the majority's
assignment of the burden of proof was consistent with earlier jury
venire decisions. In the past the Court had found a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination only when there was complete exclusion
of Negroes or blatant tokenism. 27 The Court had made no effort to
21. 380 U.S. at 205.
22. Mr. Justice White, however, stated that Negroes were under-represented by 10%.
Id. at 208-09. This is plain error. Presumably he meant that Negroes were under.repre-
sented by about 10 percentage points--26%-l5%.
23. Ibid.
24. This is Mr. Justice White's description of Alabama law. Id. at 206. See ALA. CoDon
tit. 30, §§ 20, 21 (1958). Alabama law also states that illiterates cannot serve as jurors
unless they are freeholders or householders. Whether this is a "rational classification"
was not raised in Swain.
25. 380 U.S. at 209.
26. Ibid.
27. Typical cases in which the Court did find discrimination are Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587 (1935) (no Negro called for jury service within memory); Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354 (1939) (one Negro called for jury service within memory); Patton v. Missis.
sippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) (two or three Negroes called in thirty years).
The Court did not find discrimination in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 477 (1953),
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establish more rigorous statistical tests for showing purposeful discrim-
ination. Nor had the Court attempted to impose upon the jury com-
missioners any affirmative obligation to secure fair representation for
Negroes.28
It is unlikely that the Court's unwillingness to impose affirmative
obligations on jury commissioners has been due primarily to its reluc-
tance to interfere with state activities. First, the Court has not super-
vised even federal jury commissioners.- 9 And second, the Court has
not hesitated to place affirmative duties on state officials in equal pro-
tection cases involving desegregation and reapportionment.30 The more
serious problem facing the Court has been its inability to establish a
selection procedure which reasonably can be required of the states.
Ideally, jury commissioners should choose prospective jurors at random
from a comprehensive list and then check each juror's qualifications.31
where Negroes constituted 38% of the eligible veniremen and only 7% of the actual
veniremen.
28. There was one minor exception. The Court held that jury commissioners who
select prospective jurors from their personal acquaintances have a duty to become ac-
quainted with Negroes in the community in order to ascertain whether there are Negroes
qualified for jury service. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942). See also Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128 (1940). As indicated in note 27 supra and accompanying text, however, the
commissioners did not have to fear judicial supervision once they placed more than a
token number of qualified Negroes on the jury lists.
29. The Court has not imposed more stringent requirements on federal commissioners
than on state commissioners. A recent survey by the Southern Regional Council demon-
strated that Negroes were decidedly under-represented on federal venires in many sections
of the South. See N.Y. Times, April 25, 1965, p. 76, col. 3. And in a letter to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, February 11, 1965, Attorney General Katzenbach stated
that ". . . there appears to be a serious need for the strengthening of jury selection
methods in the Federal Courts." H.R. REP,. No. 261, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1965).
Two federal jury selection cases are presently pending before the Fifth Circuit. Jack-
son v. United States, appeal docketed, No. 21,345 (1965) and Rabinowitz v. United States,
appeal docketed, No. 21,256 (1965).
30. Allowing Negro children to enter previously all-white schools has created admin-
istrative problems for the state in terms of classroom facilities, transportation facilities,
teacher shifts, etc. The Court has taken this into account only to the extent of permit-
ting states to desegregate "with all deliberate speed." Brown v. Board of Education, 349
US. 294, 299-301 (1955).
Reapportionment has also involved administrative difficulties. More significantly, the
reapportionment cases marked an entirely new form of judicial intervention in the affairs
of the states. See Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186,
266 (1962).
31. Random selection ensures that commissioners do not choose jurors on account of
their race. "Jurymen should be selected as individuals, on the basis of individual quali-
fications, and not as members of a race." Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950). See
Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.), second petition for rehearing denied, 335 F.2d
417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964), where the Fifth Circuit reversed a con-
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Unfortunately, however, no comprehensive list of names exists in
many parts of the South. Because of past discrimination current voter
registration lists grossly under-represent Negroes. Telephone direc-
tories, utility customer records, and local tax lists are also likely to
under-represent Negroes substantially.8 2 This lack of representative
sources probably explains the Court's past unwillingness to formulate
a more rigorous statistical standard than the rule of exclusion. It also
explains the Court's tolerance of such haphazard and imperfect selec-
tion procedures as the "key man" system, whereby the power of se-
lection is placed in the hands of a few community leaders. 8 Of course,
the Court might have required the jury commissioners to use the most
representative source available. But since, in the past, almost all sources
were unrepresentative, their use might have been even more unsatis-
factory than haphazard selection methods. Those few representative
lists which did exist, for example, city directories, 84 covered only cer-
tain parts of counties.
In the future, however, the Voting Rights Act of 196588 will ensure
the existence of representative registration lists. But there is no guar-
antee that jury commissioners will use these lists as sources without
judicial prodding. The Court, therefore, should require that jury com-
missioners use voting lists unless another more comprehensive list is
viction because Negroes had been intentionally included on a grand jury. See also Com-
ment, 74 YALE L.J. 887 (1965).
32. As of December 31, 1963, only 50% of the households in Mississippi had tele-
phones. Percentages for the other Southern states ranged from 59% (Arkansas) to 72%
(Louisiana). By contrast, 94% of Connecticut households had telephones. STATISTICAL
AwsmAcT oF THE UNrrTD STATES 517 (1965). It can be presumed that a disproportionate
number of the Southern households without telephones are Negro. Utility customer rec-
ords will also under-represent Negroes because utility bills are often paid by the landlord
or plantation manager rather than by tenants.
This lack of representative sources has led some civil rights lawyers to demand that
jury commissioners be required to use modem sampling and polling techniques such as
those developed by George Gallup. See Brief for Appellants, pp. 15-20, Billingsley v.
Clayton, appeal docketed, No. 22,304, 5th Cir., June, 1965.
33. Under the "key man" system, a few community leaders are asked to recommend
prospective jurors. Since the key men are usually white, this system is likely to result in
under-representation of Negroes. It is also likely to result in the selection of "reliable"
Negroes who will be sensitive to the wishes of the white leadership community. The jury
commissioners in Talladega County relied partly on the key man system. 380 U.S. at
207 n.4.
34. A city directory is a book containing the names and addresses of local residents
and extensive advertising by local businessmen. It is put out by the local businessmen,
and often covers more households than the telephone directory. It would not, however,
cover households in rural areas of a county.
35. P.L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
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reasonably available.3 6 The use of voting lists could be required under
the established doctrine that states must refrain from "purposeful dis-
crimination." It is clear that selection methods which appear haphazard
can easily mask purposeful discrimination. Jury commissioners may
intentionally choose selection methods which under-represent Negroes
and then testify that the under-representation was purely fortuitous.
This testimony would be impossible to impeach. 7 The Court can
legitimately require states to use a single source list, instead of the usual
potpourri,3 8 in order to minimize the possibility of "fortuitous" dis-
crimination.39 The constitutional basis for Court action is, therefore,
clear.
Recently, however, there have been suggestions for congressional
legislation on juries,40 and it might be argued that the Court should
forbear and let Congress deal with the problem. The advisability of
such forbearance depends, in part, on whether there are substantial
advantages in congressional, as opposed to judicial, action. Any rule
announced by the Court would almost certainly apply to previous con-
victions.4 1 To those who fear retroactive application, one apparent ad-
56. If the entire county consists of one city, the city directory may be a more repre-
sentative source than the registration lists. It is also possible that a state might not wish
to restrict jury service to registered voters. Such a state should be allowed to place the
names of non-voters on a consolidated source list, but only upon the condition that the
new source list is no less representative than the registration list itself. This condition
prevents the state from adding only white non-voters to the consolidated source list.
The requirement of a single source list will probably force most jurisdictions to change
their entire jury list. This may mean that the state will have to delay all its criminal
proceedings for several weeks. The attorney general of Maryland recently instituted such
a delay when the state's venires were declared unconstitutional by the Maryland Court
of Appeals because prospective jurors had to affirm their belief in God. See Scho.gurow
v. State, 34 U.S.L. WVEE 2198 (Ad. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1965); Baltimore Sun, Oct. 14, 1955.
p. C26, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1965, p. 54, col. 1.
37. The testimony of the commissioners could be negated only if there were com-
plete exclusion or blatant tokenism. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
88. In Talladega County, for example, the commissioners apparently used "city di-
rectories, [voter] registration lists, club and church lists, conversations with other persons
in the community, both white and colored, and personal and business acquaintances."
380 US. at 207. When there are so many sources, it becomes difficult for the courts to
supervise the commissioners effectively.
59. The likelihood of disguised discrimination undoubtedly influenced the Court's
opinions in Hlill v. Txas, 316 US. 400 (1942), and Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
where the commissioners testified that they did not purposely discriminate, but that they
didn't personally know any qualified Negroes.
40. President Johnson has announced that he will ask the next session of Congress
for legislation aimed at preventing "injustice to Negroes at the hands of all-white juries.-
N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1965, p. 1, col. 4.
41. The constitutional principles enunciated by the Court in Griffin v. Illinois, 351
1965]
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vantage of legislation would be that Congress could apply its statute
prospectively only. It is not clear, however, that retroactive application
could, in fact, be avoided by legislation, even if Congress declared that
the legislation applied prospectively only. Congress derives its power to
legislate about state juries from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.42 The constitutional theory would be that the legislation was
necessary to enforce Negro defendants' rights to the equal protection of
the laws. A decision upholding the legislation as applied to a partic-
ular state might be based, at least implicitly, on a finding that the
state had been violating the Fourteenth Amendment. After such a
decision, a Negro defendant, convicted before the passage of the Act,
could argue that his conviction should be reversed because the decision
established that his state had infringed his constitutional rights. The
Court might find it difficult to reject this argument and avoid retro-
active application of his constitutional rights. 43
A second possible advantage of action by Congress is that it could
impose a more rigorous requirement than the one suggested in this
Note. Congress could demand, for example, that every state employ
source lists which do not under-represent Negroes by more than 10%.
Or Congress could direct federal officials to take a census in order to
draw up new source lists. These suggestions would ensure more prompt
compliance and would relieve the states of some of the financial burden
of implementing the new requirement. The Court, of course, could
not send in federal officials. Nor is the Court likely to promulgate a
precise mathematical rule for Negro representation on source lists.
And probably the Court would not require completely new source lists
U.S. 12 (1956) (free trial transcript for indigent appellant), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel), and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (coerced
confession), were applied retroactively by the Court in Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S.
214 (1958), Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964), and McNerlin v. Denno, 378 U.S.
575 (1964). The reason for applying these principles retroactively was that they "went to
the fairness of the trial-the very integrity of the fact-finding process." Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965). A Court decision on jury selection procedures would
also go to the "integrity of the fact-finding process."
42. "Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article."
43. However, the legislation might be upheld on other theories which would not
require retroactive application. For example, the Court could find that Congress meant
to ensure equal protection in the future and that Congress did not make specific find-
ings about denials of equal protection in the past. Or, the Court could uphold the
legislation on the theory that Congress found a denial of equal protection in jury selec.
tion throughout the South, but that Congress did not find discrimination In any partic.
ular county. Therefore, a defendant from any particular county could not use the legis-
lation as proof of past discrimination.
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unless it determines that a less burdensome requirement, such as the
"most representative source" rule, is insufficient.
44
But the fact that Congress could impose stricter standards on the
state does not justify judicial forbearance. Action by the Court would
in no way impair Congress' ability to act more vigorously later. Thus
the Court should not hesitate to establish the "most representative
source" requirement. Having held that purposeful discrimination is
forbidden, the Court should not allow states to use selection methods
which frequently mask such discrimination.
If the new source requirement is established, problems of admin-
istration would remain. When a defendanta  shows that Negroes are
under-represented on venires and that the state is not using the proper
source, the court would reverse his conviction. But if the state is using
the proper source and Negroes are still under-represented on venires,
the administration of the rule would become more complex. First the
defendant must demonstrate that the percentage of Negroes on venires
is less than the percentage of Negroes on the source list. Upon this
demonstration, the burden should shift to the state to show a non-
discriminatory reason for the disparity. Generally, a state would try
to show that the disparity is caused by the local Negroes' relative lack
of qualifications.46 Of course, the state would have to show that its
standards of qualification are constitutionally permissible,4 - and that
they are fairly applied.
44. Another advantage which might be ascribed to congressional legislation is that it
expresses a national consensus and will therefore elicit greater compliance than a judi-
cial decision. This proposition may have been valid in 1954 when it appeared to some
Americans that "nine old men" were trying to foist civil rights on an unconcerned nation.
But since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 the national consensus on civil rights is abundantly clear, and compliance is un-
likely to be greater because Congress, rather than the Court, has acted.
45. In the past, challenges to selection methods have invariably come from Negro de-
fendants. Recently, however, Negro citizens have brought class action suits against state
jury officials, and the Department of Justice has announced it will intervene in some of
these suits. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1965, p. 28, col. S. On the statutory basis for such suits,
see Cassell v. Texas, 339 US. 282, 303-04 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
White defendants have traditionally been barred from raising the issue of discrimina-
tion against Negroes on the ground that they lacked standing. Comment, 74 YALE UJ.
919, 920 & n.10 (1965). This "same class" rule was recently rejected in Allen v. State, 110
Ga. App. 56, 187 S.E.2d 711 (1964), and has been cogently criticized in Comment, supra.
46. Occasionally, the state might make another showing-e.g., that a disproportionate
number of Negroes neglect to answer summons to report for jury service or that a dis-
proportionate number of Negroes are no longer at the address listed on the source list.
47. The constitutionality of a qualification is presently judged by reference to tile
"cross section" test. In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 828 U.S. 217, 220 (1946), the Court
held that federal juries must be drawn from "a cross section of the community" and
must not systematically and intentionally exclude economic, geographic, political, racial.
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If the Court treats selection methods and qualifications in the above
manner, it can ensure that in many Southern counties there will be
enough Negroes on the venire so that the prosecutor cannot challenge
them all without help from the defendant. The Court's supervision
will obviously be most effective in those counties where there is a
large Negro population, and these are the counties which are most
likely to discriminate in the selection of jurors.48 The Court's super-
vision will also be very effective in states which allow the prosecutor
only a few challenges and in states which give the prosecutor only half
as many challenges as the defendant.49
A serious problem would be raised, however, if a state changes its
peremptory challenge system in order to evade the supervisory proce-
dure outlined in this Note. For example, a state could give the prose-
cutor three times as many challenges as the defense, and thus allow
the prosecutory to remove all Negroes even if they constituted 75%
of the venire.50 But any legislation which gave the prosecutor more
challenges than the defendant would appear to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of due process. The peremptory challenge has
never been regarded as an instrument to allow the prosecutor an ad-
vantage in the selection of juries.5' No state gives the prosecutor more
religious or social groups. In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953), the Court said
that the states must use a source which "reasonably reflects a cross-section of the popu-
lation suitable in character and intelligence for [jury] duty." Thus a state qualification
can be judged by seeing if it systematically and intentionally excludes any of the groups
covered by the cross section test.
48. The following important jury cases have taken place in counties where Negroes
constituted at least 33% of the population: Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 355 (1939);
Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Harper
v. State, - Miss. -, 171 So. 2d 129 (1965). Two of the four Supreme Court cases on
grand jury discrimination have taken place in counties where Negroes constituted at
least 33% of the population: Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Arnold v. North
Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964).
In general, the sections of the South with the highest Negro population discriminate
most against Negroes. See KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 5-6, 531, 540-41
(1950).
49. Virginia and South Carolina allow the prosecutor only four and five challenges
respectively. See note 19 supra. Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina and South
Carolina all give the defendant at least twice as many strikes or challenges in felony
and capital cases. ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 64 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 59"805 (1937); MU. ANN.
CODE, Rules Proc. 746 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-163-164 (1953); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-
211 (1962).
50. This is assuming that the number of challenges allowed is substantial-e.g., 21 for
the prosecution and 7 for the defense, not 3 and 1 respectively.
51. Initially the peremptory challenge was regarded as an instrument of the defense.
Thus, Blackstone wrote that ". .. in criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there is,
in favorem vitae, allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge
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challenges than the defendant, and many give the prosecutor less. 2
To reverse the advantage would pervert the purposes of the peremptory
challenge.
The state, however, may amend its challenge system in a way which
does not on its face violate due process. For example, Virginia and
Texas now give the prosecutor and defendant the same number of
challenges, while Alabama and Georgia give the defendant twice as
many.53 If Alabama or Georgia changed to the system of Virginia and
Texas, the prosecutor could remove many more Negroes, but the new
system would not appear to violate due process. Of course, a state might
be reluctant to change its policy of favoring defendants solely because
of the race issue.54 Or, the state legislature might fear that such a change
would make it difficult for white defendants in civil rights cases to
obtain an all-white jury. 5 Finally, the state legislature might fear that
its action would spur the Court to abolish the peremptory challenge
for prosecutors altogether. This latter possibility was suggested by
Mr. Justice Goldberg in Swain.56
If the legislature changed the challenge system, the Court might
respond in another way. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,5 7 Negro citizens
of Alabama challenged a state redistricting measure which was valid
on its face but which was allegedly passed to deprive petitioners of
their right to vote in the city of Tuskegee. The Court held that if
petitioners' allegations were proved, they would demonstrate that
"the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored
to a certain number of jurors, without showing any cause at all, which is called a
peremptoy challenge; a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners for
which our English laws are justly famous." 4 BLACMStONE, Co.rsmrAmsr 353 (13th ed.
1796). See also Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion, 380 U.S. 202, 24244.
52. The Southern states which give the defense more challenges are listed in note 49
supra. Fa. R. Carni. P. 24(b) allows each side 20 challenges in capital cases, but gives
the government 6 and the defense 10 in non-capital felony cases.
53. Tax. CODE C.It. PROC. tit. 8, arts. 615, 634 (1941); VA. CoDE AN-v. § 19.1-203
(1960). The Alabama and Georgia statutes are listed in note 49 supra.
54. Alabama, for example, has allowed defendants more challenges since at least 1867.
See 380 U.S. 202, 211 n.8.
55. The existence of an all-white jury has been significant in the acquittal of white de-
fendants such as Collie Leroy Wilkins and Thomas L. Coleman. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 21,
1965, p. 1, col. 6; id. Oct. 23, 1965, p. 1, coL 4.
56. 380 US. at 243-44. Mr. Justice Goldberg pointed out that the peremptory chal-
lenge is not constitutionally required, while "trial by an impartial jury" is. "Were it
necessary," he continued, "to make an absolute choice between the right of a defendant
to have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice of the
former."
57. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of
their pre-existing municipal vote."' ," Similarly, in the challenge situa-
tion, a Negro might be able to demonstrate that the state legislature
was "solely concerned" with depriving Negroes of the right to serve
on juries.59
If the Court is unable to prevent states from changing their peremp-
tory challenge rules, and if it is unwilling to abolish the prosecutor's
challenges altogether, the states may be able to destroy the effectiveness
of the proposed rule. But the Court should not allow possible evasion
to justify avoiding its obligation to ensure representative venires.
Moreover, even if legislation on peremptories does become necessary,
Congress could not legislate intelligently without first seeing how pros-
ecutors use peremptories when venires fairly represent the Negro pop-
ulation. Thus, at the next opportunity, the Court should require the
states to use fair procedures for selecting veniremen.
58. Id. at 341.
59. There might be speeches and statements affirmatively demonstrating that the sole
concern of the law was to enable prosecutors to continue to exclude Negroes from juries.
Or the sole concern might be inferred from the fact that there had been no pressure to
change the challenge system for decades-until jury selection procedures were tightened.
In Gomillion, the discriminatory concern of the state was apparent from the gerry-
mandering arrangement itself, and no other evidence was needed. But In Davis v.
Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aJJ'd per curiam, 386 U.S. 933 (1949), a threc-judge
district court used articles and speeches of prominent white citizens to demonstrate that
the purpose of a new Alabama voting qualification was to exclude Negroes. The judges
also took note of the fact that the old qualifications had "stood for nearly 50 years and
[had] provided definite standards for passing upon the qualifications of prospective
electors." Id. at 876. See also Brown v. Baskin, 78 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.S.C. 1948), 80 F. Supp.
1017 (E.D.S.C. 1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949).
It is not certain that the Supreme Court would go as far as these lower courts in
finding discriminatory purpose. It should be remembered, however, that the Court has
shown a marked willingness to extend its concepts in civil rights cases involving states
which attempt to evade the force of its rulings. In particular, note the expanding con-
ception of state action in the famous "white primary" cases. Nixon v. Herndon, 278 U.S.
536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 78 (1932); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1955);
United States v. Classic, 813 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 821 U.S. 649 (1944);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). See Note, 74 YALE L.J. 1448 (1965).
